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A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENTIAL APPROACH  




Independent functioning is not simply the ability to do something, but also 
the ability to decide what to do.  It is not only the ability to take care of 
oneself.  It is also the ability to take responsibility for oneself.  Autonomy 
and independence do not grow out of being told what to do and when to 
do it.  It is only by having his needs considered, by becoming a participant 
in the decision-making process, that a child develops the capacity for 
autonomy.1
American psychiatrist Elaine Heffner offered the preceding in-
sight in the specific context of early childhood psychological 
development.  Her message, however, rings true for others—
specifically, adults with mild cognitive impairment.  Persons with mild 
cognitive impairment are a unique constituency, possessing various 
abilities and special needs.2  These persons are often subject to 
guardianship arrangements in which their autonomy is compromised 
to protect their best interests.  This Comment explores guardianship 
proceedings and arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive 
impairment through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, with the hope 
that such an approach will ultimately increase autonomy in these ar-
rangements. 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2001, 
Fordham University.  The author would like to thank Dean Kathleen Boozang, Pro-
fessor John Jacobi, Joseph McManus, Michael Shortt, and Michael McGuire for all of 
their help and assistance with this Comment. 
 1 ELAINE HEFFNER, MOTHERING: HOW WOMEN CAN ENJOY A NEW RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THEIR CHILDREN—AND A NEW IMAGE OF THEMSELVES 103 (Anchor Books 1980). 
 2 Mild cognitive impairment, also known as mild mental retardation, is a devel-
opmental disability that involves low intelligence test scores (also known as IQ 
scores) and difficulty adapting to the demands of living.  See discussion infra Part 
III.B. 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ)3 is a psycho-social-legal theory 
that can meaningfully inform aspects of guardianship4 proceedings 
and arrangements involving adults with mild cognitive impairments.5  
Applying TJ principles in this setting can enhance the accuracy of in-
competency proceedings, increase wards’ participation and feelings 
of control, and generate greater overall ward satisfaction with guardi-
anship arrangements—thereby creating a unique opportunity for 
autonomy-maximizing arrangements.6  As a legal theory, TJ empha-
sizes the impact of case law and legislation on participants in the legal 
system, particularly in the context of mental health law.7  A TJ per-
spective seeks to understand how legal rules, procedures, and roles 
influence and affect participants in the legal system.8  It is important 
to determine the extent to which guardianship proceedings and ar-
rangements incorporate therapeutic principles and allow for the 
ward’s participation and feelings of control over life decisions, be-
cause participation and feelings of control are likely to positively 
influence levels of satisfaction among wards.9  Ward participation and 
attendant feelings of control create the potential for autonomy-
maximizing arrangements and can help to combat feelings of help-
 3 TJ is defined as: 
an interdisciplinary approach to law that builds on the basic insight 
that law is a social force that has inevitable (if unintended) conse-
quences for the mental health and psychological functioning of those 
it affects.  Therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that these positive and 
negative consequences be studied with the tools of the behavioral sci-
ences, and that, consistent with considerations of justice and other 
relevant normative values, law be reformed to minimize anti-
therapeutic consequences and to facilitate achievement of therapeutic 
ones. 
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 7 (Dennis P. 
Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
 4 Guardianship is defined as “the delegation, by the state, of authority over an 
individual’s person or estate to another party.”  GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND 
LAWYERS 339 (2d ed. 1997). 
 5 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 6 See discussion infra Part V.A.1. 
 7 See supra note 3. 
 8 See DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC 
AGENT 4 (1990). 
 9 Psychologists define personal control as a sense that one has a degree of con-
trol over their environment, as opposed to feeling helpless.  DAVID G. MYERS, 
PSYCHOLOGY: MYERS IN MODULES 539 (6th ed. 2001).   Studies have shown that people 
who believe that they can control their fate and destiny are more successful, inde-
pendent, and healthy.  See, e.g., Margie Lachman & Susan Weaver, The Sense of Control 
as a Moderator of Social Class Differences in Health and Well-Being, 74 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 763–73 (1998). 
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lessness and disengagement that can result in, among other things, 
the phenomenon of learned helplessness.10  Further, research sug-
gests that when persons are actively involved in decision-making, they 
are more likely to consider decisions fair and to comply with them.11
This Comment will apply a TJ framework to understand how le-
gal rules (actual laws), legal procedures (legal processes), and legal 
roles (behaviors of legal actors such as judges, lawyers, guardians, and 
wards) associated with guardianship proceedings and arrangements 
influence the participation, feelings of control, levels of satisfaction, 
and, ultimately, the personal autonomy of wards with mild cognitive 
impairment.  Part I of this Comment introduces the major tenets of 
TJ.  Part II examines contexts in which TJ has been applied, namely, 
drug and mental health courts.  Part III.A discusses the history of 
guardianship and the current approaches to making guardianship 
determinations.  Part III.B then describes mild cognitive impairment 
and guardianships involving persons with mild cognitive impairment.  
Part IV discusses legal rules and procedures in this context while ana-
lyzing New York’s approaches to guardianship, concluding that the 
functional and objective approach of New York’s Article 81 is supe-
rior to other approaches.  Part V analyzes legal procedures and legal 
roles, focusing on the effects of procedures and roles in both the 
“front-end” and “back-end” of guardianship proceedings and ar-
rangements.  Part VI presents counterarguments to the TJ approach 
in this context.  Finally, Part VII concludes that the application of TJ 
principles in this context can increase feelings of participation, con-
trol, and satisfaction and can help to create optimal outcomes for this 
population. 
 10 Learned helplessness is a phenomenon in which persons and animals stop at-
tempting to exert control over their environment because past attempts have proven 
fruitless.  MYERS, supra note 9, at 540.  This result tends to lead to dissatisfaction and 
stress.  See, e.g., MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND DEATH (1975).  Mentally disabled individuals experience paternalism in various 
legal–as well as social–contexts and, as a group, are likely to develop feelings of help-
lessness and loss of control.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1990) (citing 
“overprotective rules and policies” as one form of discrimination confronting dis-
abled individuals). 
 11 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for 
Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 439–40 (1992). 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
Professor David B. Wexler has described TJ as “the study of the 
use of the law to achieve therapeutic objectives.”12  Professor Wexler 
and Professor Bruce J. Winick, the movement’s founders, have writ-
ten extensively on the topic, applying its tenets in a number of mental 
health law contexts.13  TJ considers the law (i.e., legal rules, legal pro-
cedures, and the functions of legal actors) as a social force that 
shapes behaviors and outcomes.14  The law may have “therapeutic,” 
healing, positive, and workable effects.15  On the other hand, the law 
may produce “anti-therapeutic” or detrimental outcomes.16
The TJ perspective also offers another important observation—
some laws that are intended to protect vulnerable persons may have 
the unintended consequence of harming those persons.17  The po-
tentially harmful effects of purportedly protective laws have been 
explored in contexts outside of the guardianship realm.  For exam-
ple, Kay Kavanagh has considered the unintended impact of the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy regarding homosexuality.18  
She states that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is intended to inte-
grate homosexuals into the military and also to protect them from 
the long-held belief that “homosexuality is incompatible with military 
service.”19  The author concludes, however, that the policy does more 
harm than good for homosexual members of the military, because 
required nondisclosure of sexual orientation may leave them feeling 
socially isolated and marginalized.20  This is because sexual orienta-
tion, homosexual or heterosexual, is significantly intertwined with 
aspects of daily life.21  For example, under the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
 12 WEXLER, supra note 8, at 4. 
 13 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, The Side Effects of Incompetency Labeling and the Implica-
tions for Mental Health Law, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 17 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY]; David B. Wexler, Some Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Implications of the Outpatient Civil Commitment of Pregnant Substance Abusers, in LAW 
IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra, 145. 
 14 David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
125, 125 (2000). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Kay Kavanagh, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: Deception Required, Disclosure Denied, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 142, 143 (1995). 
 19 Id. at 144 (citation omitted). 
 20 Id. at 151–53. 
 21 Id. at 153. 
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policy, homosexuals in the military are precluded from discussing 
topics that may divulge their homosexual status.22  Thus, the policy 
forecloses the possibility of discussions about many aspects of one’s 
personal life, including discussions about with whom one lives, 
spends time, and celebrates important occasions.23  The requirement 
of nondisclosure therefore has an anti-therapeutic, chilling function 
that does not effectuate positive or beneficial outcomes.24
The potential for the law to have anti-therapeutic outcomes has 
also been observed in the disability setting.25  Some argue that the 
confidentiality provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
can have the unintended and detrimental consequence of creating a 
secretive, less effective, and less integrated work environment.26  The 
ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a disabled 
employee by failing to make reasonable accommodations for the em-
ployee’s disability.27  The confidentiality provision—in the context of 
a request for a reasonable workplace accommodation—enables the 
disabled worker to reveal his or her disability to the employer or su-
pervisor, but not to co-workers.28  This confidentiality provision, while 
intended to protect the employee from discrimination by co-workers, 
can create an environment of misunderstanding and inefficiency be-
cause co-workers are unable to participate in the integration of the 
disabled worker.29  Conversely, the participation of co-workers will 
likely decrease speculation about the disabled worker and any atten-
dant accommodations and can create a work environment in which 
the disabled employee can most effectively benefit from the knowl-
edge and experience of co-workers.30
The same concept may be applied in the context of guardian-
ship.  A legal system (i.e., legal rules, procedures, and roles) fails to 
offer the appropriate protections and functions of guardianship 
when it neither promotes the participation of wards, when appropri-
ate, nor attempts to create autonomy-maximizing arrangements 
 22 Id. at 146. 
 23 Id. at 154. 
 24 See Kavanagh, supra note 18, at 143. 
 25 Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Designing Reasonable Accommodations Through Co-worker Par-
ticipation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Confidentiality Provision of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 89, 90–91 (1993–94). 
 26 Id. 
 27 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A) (1993). 
 28 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i) (allowing disclosure of information pertaining to re-
strictions on job duties and necessary accommodations). 
 29 Daly-Rooney, supra note 25, at 92. 
 30 Id. at 93. 
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among guardians and wards.31  Because mildly cognitively impaired 
persons are particularly capable of assuming an active role in deci-
sions about their person and property, a legal system that 
disenfranchises this group will not produce optimal outcomes and 
may have the unintended consequence of promoting disengagement 
among wards.32
II. THE APPLICATION OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES 
IN OTHER AREAS: DRUG COURTS AND MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 
The tenets of TJ have been applied in both criminal and civil 
contexts.  A brief overview will demonstrate the goals and practical 
applications of the perspective while providing a framework for un-
derstanding the appropriate application of TJ in the civil 
guardianship context. 
Principles of TJ have long been applied in the criminal arena.  
Myriad scholarly works have applied tenets of TJ to a range of crimi-
nal matters,33 including domestic violence,34 juvenile delinquency,35 
and most notably, substance abuse.36  Regarding the latter, much of 
the literature focuses on drug courts.37
Drug courts were developed under the premise that combining 
rehabilitative and treatment goals with the traditional goals of retri-
bution and deterrence can reduce subsequent drug abuse and lower 
recidivism rates amongst offenders.38  In order to effectuate this goal, 
the drug court model places new duties on judges, requiring them to 
assume a more active role in the proceedings.39  While common law 
 31 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the guardianship reform movement and its 
goal of preserving autonomy in guardianship arrangements. 
 32 See discussion infra Part V.A.1. 
 33 See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 14, at 131–34. 
 34 See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 33–35 (2000). 
 35 See, e.g., Georgia Zara, Essay, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as an Integrative Approach 
to Understanding the Socio-psychological Reality of Young Offenders, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 127, 
128 (2002); Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competence to Stand Trial in Juvenile 
Court in Massachusetts: Issues of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, 
supra note 13, at 113, 113–14. 
 36 See, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, The Drug Court Response: Issues and Implications for 
Justice Change, 63 ALB. L. REV. 923, 930 (2000). 
 37 See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT 
MOVEMENT (2001) for a thorough introduction to the literature in this area. 
 38 Candace McCoy, Community Courts and Community Justice: Commentary: The Poli-
tics of Problem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2003) (citing rehabilitation and efficiency, as well as 
economics, as goals of the drug court model). 
 39 Goldkamp, supra note 36, at 930. 
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(as opposed to civil law) judges typically exemplify detachment, pas-
sivity, and restraint in the adjudicative process,40 judges in drug courts 
become actively involved in the process “in a manner more like pro-
active therapists than dispassionate judicial officers.”41  Further, 
attorneys assume a less significant role in the drug court.42  This re-
configuration of traditional criminal procedural and substantive law 
is intended to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and therapeutic out-
comes.43  Drug court judges have acknowledged that the traditional 
criminal justice system can have anti-therapeutic consequences and 
that the philosophy behind drug courts can encourage long-term so-
lutions to problems of drug abuse and addiction.44
Some research findings demonstrate the effectiveness of drug 
courts and the value of implementing a TJ model.45  One compre-
hensive study concluded that drug courts reduce drug use and 
recidivism rates, and lessen the direct and indirect costs of dealing 
with drug-related crime.46  Drug courts’ success can be attributed to 
long-term offender engagement,47 as well as a therapeutic methodol-
ogy that attempts to treat the underlying problem.48
Like drug courts, mental health courts apply TJ principles to 
maximize positive outcomes in the mental health setting.  Similar to 
drug courts, mental health courts emphasize treatment for those who 
become involved in the criminal justice system due to mental health 
issues.49  The mental health court model is cooperative and primarily 
 40 NOLAN, supra note 37, at 92. 
 41 Id. at 40. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 58–60. 
 44 Id. at 50 (citing Judges Peggy Hora and William Schma, who argue that the 
traditional criminal justice response to drug abuse and addiction keeps offenders in 
denial because it does not encourage them to accept responsibility for their actions 
or to sufficiently realize the impact of their drug abuse, and because it lowers their 
self-esteem). 
 45 See, e.g., Steven Belenko, Ph.D., Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review 2001 
Update, THE NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA 
UNIVERSITY, June 2001, http://www.casacolumbia.org/absolutenm/articlefiles/ 
researchondrug.pdf. 
 46 Id. 
 47 JUDGE JEFF TAUBER & C. WEST HUDDLESTON, DUI/DRUG COURTS: DEFINING A 
NATIONAL STRATEGY 4 (1999). 
 48 See, e.g., NOLAN, supra note 37, at 34. 
 49 RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
ASPECTS 850 (4th ed. 2004). 
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non-adversarial.50  As with drug courts, the legal players take on new 
roles; prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement personnel and 
representatives of correctional and treatment facilities all collaborate 
to create a positive, long-term result for the mentally ill offender.51
At initial hearings in mental health courts, the judge will typi-
cally use expert testimony by mental health professionals to evaluate 
the offender’s mental state and determine competency.52  Judges in 
mental health courts may order necessary treatment for mentally ill 
offenders and some jurisdictions have created “functional conditional 
release plans” in which offenders are treated in the least restrictive 
setting (usually in the community) and are closely monitored by the 
mental health court.53  The mental health court’s emphasis on treat-
ing the underlying illness, the court’s intimate familiarity with issues 
of mental illness, and its careful monitoring schemes function to fa-
cilitate the treatment of mentally ill offenders and their reintegration 
into society.54  Such a system is consonant with the goals and objec-
tives of TJ. 
Drug and mental health courts apply therapeutic principles with 
much success.  By focusing on the helping or therapeutic aspects of 
legal intervention in the lives of drug abusers and mentally ill offend-
ers, these courts provide nuanced approaches to complicated 
problems.55  While not without their critics,56 such courts and the 
theories they embrace tend to minimize anti-therapeutic and unin-
tended consequences of the legal system.57  The success of these 
specialty courts counsels for applying the principles of TJ in other set-
tings, such as guardianship. 
 50 LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in 
the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255, 291 
(2001). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 292–93. 
 53 Id. at 298–302. 
 54 Id. at 322. 
 55 NOLAN, supra note 37, at 50. 
 56 See, e.g., Judge Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-
Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dan-
gerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2072 (2002) (arguing that the TJ movement and 
courts that implement its principles, including drug courts, are both ineffective and 
dangerous because among other things, legal actors are unfit to devise therapeutic 
outcomes).  See discussion infra Part VI. 
 57 NOLAN, supra note 37, at 50. 
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III. GUARDIANSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIVIDUALS WITH  
MILD COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT 
A. Introduction to Guardianship 
Guardianship is the “delegation, by the state, of authority over 
an individual’s person or estate to another party.”58  Guardianship has 
ancient origins in Roman and English common law, under which the 
sovereign had the power to safeguard the property of incompetent 
persons.59  This power was derived from the state’s interest in its own 
wealth preservation, and is the basis of the state’s parens patriae60 au-
thority.61  The appointment of a guardian is typically contemplated 
when persons are unable to appropriately care for themselves or 
when they are unable to manage their property or assets. 
The determination of incompetency/incapacity and the process 
of appointing a guardian comprise what is known as the “front-end” 
of guardianship62 and will be discussed in more detail.63  Presently, 
there are three main statutory approaches to making a guardianship 
determination.64  The first approach considers whether the individual 
is capable of taking proper care of himself or his property.65  State 
statutes that use this approach also tend to emphasize the ability (or 
lack thereof) to provide for a family, and to fend off predatory behav-
ior.66  The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) provides another approach 
to determine if guardianship is appropriate.67  State legislatures have 
incorporated “[t]he operative wording for incapacity in UPC stat-
utes,” which is “the lack of ‘sufficient understanding or capacity to 
 58 MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339. 
 59 Id. 
 60 The definition of parens patriae is “[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state 
in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). 
 61 MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339. 
 62 Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and Now: Trac-
ing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 867 (2002). 
 63 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 64 Phillip B. Tor, Ph.D. & Bruce D. Sales, J.D., Ph.D., A Social Science Perspective on 
the Law of Guardianship: Directions for Improving the Process and Practice, 18 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 65 Id. at 4–5.  This approach provides vague standards for incompetency that can 
result in inaccurate assessments of competency as well as disparate adjudications of 
similarly situated persons.  Id. at 5. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 6 (citing UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103 (Supp. 1993)).  This approach is 
arguably more progressive than the first approach, but it still suffers from vagueness 
and does not allow for a full functional assessment.  Id. at 6–7. 
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make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his per-
son.’”68  The third approach is known as the functional approach, 
and statutes drafted using this approach tend to emphasize the re-
sults or effects of specific impairments or limitations.69  Such statutes 
include references to the likelihood of imminent harm due to cogni-
zable events or occurrences.70  New York guardianship law, for 
example, exemplifies the functional approach to guardianship de-
terminations.71  The statute provides that in reaching a determination 
of incapacity, “the court shall give primary consideration to the func-
tional level and functional limitations of the person.”72  This includes 
consideration of factors such as “management of the activities of daily 
living” and an “understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
consequences of any inability to manage the activities of daily  
living . . . .”73  This Comment will discuss the functional approach in 
more detail.74
There are a variety of guardianship arrangements.  In some ju-
risdictions, a guardian may be appointed over the ward’s “person” or 
over the ward’s estate, or both.75  A guardian of the ward’s person has 
authority over health and medical decisions, while a guardian of the 
ward’s estate has authority over various aspects of the ward’s property, 
including decisions to sell property.76  The latter form of guardian is 
typically called a conservator.77  Further distinctions exist in which 
some jurisdictions restrict guardians’ powers to specific decisions.78  
This so-called specific, as opposed to plenary or general form of guardi-
anship, is intended to allow for the guardian’s intervention only when 
necessary, such as when the ward must make a novel or complicated 
decision.79
 68 Tor & Sales, supra note 64, at 6 (quoting UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-103(7) (Supp. 
1993)); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-101 (2003).  The Montana statute is illustra-
tive of the UPC approach, as Montana has adopted the UPC in its entirety. 
 69 Tor & Sales, supra note 64, at 7. 
 70 Id. at 7–8.  The functional approach is the most progressive approach to de-
termining incapacity and is likely to lead to the most objective and accurate 
assessments of competency.  Id. at 9. 
 71 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 1996). 
 72 Id. § 81.02(c) (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 75 MELTON ET AL., supra note 4, at 339. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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Once appointed, a guardian has the power to make decisions for 
the ward, subject to the limitation that the guardian acts only in the 
“best interests” of the ward.80  Thus, the guardian and the ward are in 
a fiduciary relationship that requires the guardian to act with loyalty 
and care in dealings concerning the ward.81
B. Guardianship and Individuals with Mild Cognitive Impairment 
This Comment focuses on guardianship arrangements and pro-
ceedings that involve adults with mild cognitive impairment.  This 
class of persons is unique due to their abilities to learn academic skills 
up to a sixth-grade level,82 to develop sophisticated communication 
skills,83 and to develop socially desirable behaviors.84  While persons 
with a mild degree of cognitive impairment may seem to be least in 
need of any intervention, many persons with mild cognitive impair-
ment may find themselves in need of some form of guardianship 
arrangement in order to best care for themselves and their prop-
erty.85  Mild cognitive impairment, also known as mild mental 
retardation,86 is a developmental disability that involves low intelli-
gence test scores (also known as IQ scores) and difficulty adapting to 
the demands of living.87  Persons with cognitive impairment tend to 
 80 Id. at 344. 
 81 See generally Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician 
Loyalties and Obligations in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241, 243 
(1995) (“[F]iduciary relationships include guardians to wards, lawyers to clients, cor-
porate officers and directors to shareholders, government officials to the public, and 
financial advisors, brokers, and money managers to clients.”). 
 82 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 83 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 84 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 85 Guardianship arrangements may be necessary depending on the degree of im-
pairment of social skills and impairment in the areas of self-care and communication.  
See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 86 This Comment uses the terms “cognitive impairment” and “mental retarda-
tion” interchangeably.  Recently, the vernacular associated with issues of intellectual 
impairment has shifted to what many conceive to be the more sensitive and appro-
priate terminology of “impairment” rather than “retardation,” but the term mental 
retardation is still widely used.  See generally The Life Span Institute, Research and 
Training Center on Independent Living, Guidelines for Reporting and Writing 
about People with Disabilities, http://www.lsi.ku.edu/lsi/internal/guidelines.html 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
 87 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].  Research indicates that 
the causes of mild cognitive impairment may be categorized as follows: (1) genetic 
problems, such as Down syndrome or Fragile X syndrome; (2) problems during 
pregnancy, such as maternal alcohol or drug use; (3) problems at birth, such as tem-
porary oxygen deprivation; (4) diseases in early childhood, such as measles and 
chicken pox that can lead to meningitis and encephalitis; and (5) malnutrition.  The 
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have some degree of impairment of social skills as well as problems 
functioning in other areas, such as self-care and communication.88  
Of all persons with cognitive impairment, eighty-five percent are clas-
sified as mildly cognitively impaired.89  Intelligence test scores that fall 
below a score of seventy90 evidence mild mental retardation; specifi-
cally, scores in the range of fifty to seventy are indicative of mild 
mental retardation.91
The vast majority of persons with cognitive impairment tend to 
have a mild form of such impairment.92  Just as it is difficult to speak 
generally about the abilities of persons with average intelligence, it is 
also difficult to speak generally about the abilities of persons with 
mild cognitive impairment.  Even in this relatively narrow category of 
persons, a range of propensities and aptitudes exist.93  For example, 
persons closer to the high-end of the category (those with IQ scores 
of approximately seventy) may differ in significant ways from those at 
the low-end of the category (those with IQ scores of approximately 
fifty).94
While the abilities of those with mild cognitive impairment vary, 
sometimes considerably, they may be generally classified to give a 
framework for analysis.  Generally, persons with mild cognitive im-
pairment can learn academic skills up to a sixth-grade level.95  This 
means that persons in this category have many of the skills necessary 
to meaningfully contribute and participate in important decisions 
about themselves and their lives.96  For example, many mildly cogni-
Arc, Q&A: Causes and Prevention of Mental Retardation, http://www.thearc.org/ 
faqs/causesandprev.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
 88 DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 41. 
 89 Id. at 43. 
 90 The average intelligence score on the most widely used intelligence test in the 
United States is one hundred.  MYERS, supra note 9, at 412.  Sixty-eight percent of 
persons who take this test fall within fifteen points (either above or below) of one 
hundred.  Id.  Ninety-six percent of persons test within thirty points (either above or 
below) of one hundred.  Id.  Thus, most of the population has an IQ of somewhere 
between a score of seventy and a score of one hundred and thirty.  Id.  Scores of sev-
enty and below indicate mental retardation.  Id. 
 91 DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 42. 
 92 The other three levels or degrees of cognitive impairment are moderate, se-
vere, and profound, with ten percent, three to four percent, and one to two percent 
of the cognitively impaired population, respectively, falling into each category.  DSM-
IV, supra note 87, at 43–44. 
 93 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 94 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 95 DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43. 
 96 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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tively impaired persons are able to read and write by their late teens.97  
Frequently, they develop a level of sophisticated communication 
skills.98  In fact, the Arc, a national organization dedicated to promot-
ing and improving support for persons with cognitive impairment, 
notes that persons with mild cognitive impairment possess skills that 
make them competitive for various types of employment, including 
numerous types of clerical and factory work.99  The abilities to read, 
write, and communicate create a tremendous advantage for this 
group and enable many persons with mild cognitive impairment to 
understand the nature of their impairment and to effectively com-
municate their desires, needs, wishes, and preferences.100  This ability 
is of the utmost relevance and importance to creating autonomy-
maximizing guardianship arrangements.101
Further, because of the nature of their impairment, persons in 
this category are frequently able to learn self-supportive and socially 
desirable behaviors.102  Additionally, they may have the ability to un-
derstand and comprehend rules and directions.103  These abilities 
often allow persons with mild cognitive impairment to live with mini-
mal assistance, in either supportive living systems or small group 
homes.104  These abilities create the likelihood that persons who are 
in need of some form of guardianship arrangement will be able to 
maintain maximum levels of autonomy.105
Guardianship arrangements and guardianship proceedings in-
volving persons with mild cognitive impairment present a 
phenomenon within the law in which principles of TJ may be applied 
to effectuate optimally therapeutic outcomes.  These principles, some 
of which are demonstrated in the philosophies and practices of the 
 97 See DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43 (discussing academic skills). 
 98 Id. 
 99 The Arc, Employment of People with Mental Retardation, http://www.thearc. 
org/faqs/emqa.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
 100 See Sigan L. Hartley & William E. MacLean, Jr., Perceptions of Stress and Coping 
Strategies Among Adults with Mild Mental Retardation: Insight Into Psychological Distress, 
110 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 285, 286 (2005) (discussing research that has shown 
that persons with mild mental retardation can identify and describe the coping ef-
forts they use to deal with stress). 
 101 See infra Part IV for a discussion of guardianship reform efforts that focus on 
functional assessments in creating guardianship arrangements. 
 102 DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 43. 
 103 Id. 
 104 The Arc, Community Living, http://www.thearc.org/faqs/comliv.html (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2006). 
 105 See discussion infra Part IV for a discussion of guardianship reform efforts that 
focus on functional assessments in creating guardianship arrangements. 
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specialty courts discussed above,106 can inform guardianship law both 
procedurally and substantively.  A careful and nuanced application of 
TJ principles in this area can lead to arrangements that maximize 
autonomous decision-making and minimize feelings of detachment 
and helplessness. 
IV. LEGAL RULES, OR ACTUAL LAWS, AND LEGAL  
PROCEDURES, OR LEGAL PROCESSES 
Guardianship statutes vary by state, but a common thread to 
state guardianship statutes is the influence of guardianship reform 
efforts.107  The guardianship reform movement has indeed had influ-
ence, and perhaps the most important of which is an enhanced focus 
on preserving autonomy in guardianship arrangements.108  The legis-
lative trend favoring increased autonomy in guardianship 
arrangements involves changes in the definition of “incapacity” and 
encouragement of limited guardianships, as well as improved assess-
ment methods and enhanced procedural safeguards in guardianship 
proceedings.109  Efforts to change the definition of “incapacity” have 
focused on defining incompetence or incapacity by way of objective 
standards that focus on actual abilities, as opposed to labels or “mere 
diagnosis” that place primary emphasis on a diagnosis or determina-
tion of mental retardation.110  Limited guardianships are designed to 
preserve individual autonomy by narrowly tailoring the guardianship 
arrangement to meet the individual’s specific needs, and leaving 
those areas that are within the individual’s competence to his or her 
discretion.111  All of these trends, and the developments that they 
have spawned, are consistent with the goals of TJ in that they aim to 
improve the impact of guardianship law on the lives of the persons 
the laws affect. 
The laws themselves, however, are only one part of the legal sys-
tem, and, standing alone, they cannot improve the quality of life for 
persons involved in guardianship arrangements.  Judges, lawyers, leg-
islators, guardians, and wards are all players in the legal system; each 
player must do his or her part to bring about optimal outcomes in 
the guardianship setting.  Even in the age of guardianship reform, 
 106 See discussion supra Part II. 
 107 See Neil B. Posner, Comment, The End of Parens Patriae in New York: Guardian-
ship Under the New Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 603, 607–10 (1996). 
 108 Id. at 607. 
 109 Id. at 607–10. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 609. 
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the application of TJ principles—and the similar philosophies under-
lying the drug and mental health court movements—can improve 
guardianship arrangements involving persons with mild cognitive 
impairment. 
An examination of New York’s guardianship statutes will illus-
trate both the law governing the process of making a determination 
of incapacity and appointing a guardian (the “front-end”), and the 
law governing guardian accountability and court monitoring of the 
guardian (the “back-end”). 
New York guardianship law is among the most progressive in the 
nation due to its emphasis on functional, objective assessment.112  De-
spite having extremely progressive provisions governing the 
appointment of a guardian for “persons with incapacities,” a differ-
ent, arguably less progressive, set of laws governs the appointment of 
guardians for persons with mental retardation or developmental dis-
abilities.113  Article 17-A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act 
(SCPA)114 governs guardianships for persons with mental retardation 
or developmental disabilities.  Section 1750 of the SCPA states: 
 When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a per-
son is a mentally retarded person, the court is authorized to 
appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both if 
such appointment of a guardian or guardians is in the best inter-
est of the mentally retarded person.115
More specifically, under section 1750, a court may appoint a 
guardian upon certification that the individual is incapable of manag-
ing him or herself or affairs due to the mental retardation.116  An 
incapacity determination under Article 17-A appears to focus on the 
label, or “mere diagnosis,” of mental retardation.  Such an approach 
differs significantly from an objective or functional evaluation, as 
 112 See id. at 618, 621. 
 113 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01, Practice Commentaries by Rose Mary Bailly 
248, 250 (McKinney 1996). 
 114 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT §§ 1750–61 (Consol. 2004). 
 115 Id. § 1750.  The statute defines “mentally retarded person” as: 
a person who has been certified by one licensed physician and one li-
censed psychologist, or by two licensed physicians at least one of whom 
is familiar with or has professional knowledge in the care and treat-
ment of persons with mental retardation, having qualifications to make 
such certification, as being incapable to manage him or herself and/or 
his or her affairs by reason of mental retardation and that such condi-
tion is permanent in nature or likely to continue indefinitely. 
Id. 
 116 Id. 
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seen in New York’s Mental Hygiene Law Article 81117 which governs 
proceedings for the appointment of a guardian for personal needs or 
property management of incapacitated persons.  Article 81 begins 
with legislative findings and purposes;118 the statute immediately ac-
knowledges the finding that persons with incapacities have varying 
needs.119  Such a realization is simple yet profoundly important if per-
sons with mild cognitive impairment are to be successful in 
structuring guardianship arrangements that are most appropriate for 
their individual needs.  This section of the statute seeks to balance 
maintaining individual autonomy with designing an adequately flexi-
ble guardianship regime capable of providing assistance to those in 
need.120  The legislature states that conservatorships tend to be insuf-
ficient to meet the needs of many persons with incapacities and that a 
judicial committee’s findings of complete incompetence are often 
unnecessary for many persons with disabilities.121  The legislation ac-
knowledges that many persons in need of some type of guardianship 
arrangement will not require either of these “drastic remedies,” and 
it adopts a “least restrictive form of intervention” standard designed 
to allow for maximum autonomy.122
Under Article 81, a court may appoint a guardian for an individ-
ual if the court “determines: 1. that the appointment is necessary to 
provide for the personal needs of that person . . . and/or to manage 
the property and financial affairs of that person; and 2. that the  
person agrees to the appointment, or that the person is incapaci- 
tated . . .” pursuant to the statute.123  Under the statute, a determina-
tion of incapacity must be supported by clear and convincing 
evidence, and the determination must demonstrate that: 
(b) . . . a person is likely to suffer harm because: 
1. the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or 
property management; and 
 117 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.01–81.44 (McKinney 1996). 
 118 Id. § 81.01. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id.  The legislature further states that the New York guardianship statute seeks 
to establish a system “tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in 
account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which af-
fords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and 
participation in all the decisions affecting such person’s life.”  Id. 
 123 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(a)(1) (McKinney 1996).  Personal needs in-
clude “food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety . . . .”  Id. 
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2. the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate 
the nature and consequences of such inability. 
(c) In reaching its determination, the court shall give primary 
consideration to the functional level and functional limitations of 
the person.  Such consideration shall include an assessment of 
that person’s: 
1. management of the activities of daily living . . . ; 
2. understanding and appreciation of the nature and conse-
quences of any inability to manage the activities of daily 
living; 
3. preferences, wishes, and values with regard to managing 
the activities of daily living; and 
4. the nature and extent of the person’s property and finan-
cial affairs and his or her ability to manage them.124
Article 81 provides further for a thorough assessment of the in-
dividual that considers the demands that the individual’s various 
needs (personal, property-related, financial management) place 
upon him or her.125  The statute further provides for consideration of 
the presence of and prognosis associated with any physical illness or 
mental disability, alcohol or substance dependence, as well as any 
medications that the individual is taking and their effects on the indi-
vidual’s behavior, cognition, and judgment.126  The last part of section 
81.02 stresses that the court shall consider “all other relevant facts 
and circumstances regarding the person’s: (1) functional level; and 
(2) understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences 
of his or her functional limitations.”127
 124 Id. § 81.02(b)–(c).  Section 81.03(h) provides: “‘[A]ctivities of daily living’ 
means activities such as, but not limited to, mobility, eating, toileting, dressing, 
grooming, housekeeping, cooking, shopping, money management, banking, driving 
or using public transportation, and other activities related to personal needs and to 
property management.”  Id. § 81.03(h).  The commentary to this section states that 
the court should look to these types of activities “to determine the person’s func-
tional level.”  Id. notes (Law Revision Comm’n Commentary). 
 125 Id. § 81.02(c). 
 126 Id. 
 127 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02(d) (McKinney 1996).  For an application of the 
functional evaluation, see In re Hammons, 625 N.Y.S.2d 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).  In 
this case, the Supreme Court of New York, Queens County found that, despite the 
fact that the allegedly incapacitated persons suffered from no mental impairment, 
Article 81’s focus on functional limitation required the court to give primary consid-
eration to functional level and functional limitations, and to appoint a guardian 
where the individuals were unable to care for themselves and their property and 
were likely to suffer harm as a result.  Id. at 411.  The court stated that “[a]n individ-
ual’s intelligence is not a deciding factor in an article 81 proceeding.”  Id. at 412. 
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 Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law appears to take a 
more aggressive approach to ensure that courts assess individuals sub-
ject to potential guardianship arrangements in an objective manner, 
and that courts tailor the guardian’s authority to the specific needs of 
the individual (so-called limited guardianship).128  Article 81’s em-
phasis on functional, objective assessment is crucial to the accuracy 
and appropriateness of the “front-end” of guardianship arrange-
ments.  Conversely, Article 17-A’s provisions governing incompetency 
determinations resemble pre-reform efforts that merely use a label or 
diagnosis of mental retardation as the assessment mechanism.129  
Such provisions are inferior to the functional and objective-
assessment provisions of Article 81, because mere labels of diagnoses 
of mental disability do not necessarily provide meaningful informa-
tion about an individual’s ability to function autonomously.130
Further, because the use of labels or diagnoses does not allow 
for a true understanding of an individual’s functional capacities, “ar-
bitrary findings of incapacity” may result.131  Evidence of actual 
incapacity in specific areas of life is necessary to ensure that courts do 
not deprive individuals who need some assistance of autonomy, con-
trol, or the ability to use the discretion that they are capable of 
exercising.  Article 17-A does in fact include a provision related to 
limited guardianships (limited guardian of property); however, this 
provision does not resemble Article 81’s “least restrictive form of in-
tervention”132 standard, and it only applies to an individual who is age 
eighteen or over and “wholly or substantially self-supporting by 
means of his or her wages or earnings from employment . . . .”133  In 
the case of such an individual, the limited-guardian-of-the-property 
provision states that the mentally retarded person “shall have the 
right to receive and expend any and all wages or other earnings of his 
 128 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996). 
 129 Posner, supra note 107, at 608. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996).  Section 81.03 states that 
“least restrictive form of intervention” under Article 81: 
means that the powers granted by the court to the guardian with re-
spect to the incapacitated person represent only those powers which 
are necessary to provide for that person’s personal needs and/or prop-
erty management and which are consistent with affording that person 
the greatest amount of independence and self-determination in light 
of that person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
consequences of his or her functional limitations. 
Id. § 81.03(d). 
 133 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1756 (Consol. 2004). 
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or her employment . . .”134 while the limited guardian of the prop- 
erty “shall receive, manage, disburse, and account for only such 
property . . . as shall be received from other than the wages or earn-
ings . . . .”135  Article 17-A’s limited-guardian provision is substantially 
less flexible than the limited-guardianship provision in Article 81, as 
it allows for significantly less individualized tailoring of the guardian’s 
authority to the ward’s specific needs.136  Article 17-A can benefit 
from revisions based on the Article 81 standard. 
Article 81’s “least restrictive form of intervention” standard de-
rives from the “least restrictive alternative” doctrine established by the 
Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker.137  In Shelton, the Court stated that 
“even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly 
achieved.”138  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit applied the doctrine in the civil commitment con-
text in Lake v. Cameron,139 and the New York Court of Appeals applied 
it in the context of incapacity determinations in Rivers v. Katz.140
In Rivers, the court dealt with the issue of the involuntary ad-
ministration of antipsychotic drugs to patients in a psychiatric 
center.141  The patients brought an action to declare their right to re-
fuse the drugs, and the New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower 
court’s dismissal of the patients’ action and remanded the matter to 
the trial court.142  The Court of Appeals instructed as follows: 
If . . . the [trial] court concludes that the patient lacks the capac-
ity to determine the course of his own treatment, the court must 
determine whether the proposed treatment is narrowly tailored to 
give substantive effect to the patient’s liberty interest, taking into 
consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient’s 
best interests, the benefits to be gained from the treatment, the 
 134 Id.  The statute continues and places limitations on the amount of money for 
which an individual can legally or contractually bind himself or herself.  Id.  It states 
that the individual “shall have the power to contract or legally bind himself or herself 
for such sum of money not exceeding one month’s wages or earnings from such em-
ployment or three hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or as otherwise authorized 
by the court.”  Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 See supra notes 109–30 and accompanying text. 
 137 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). 
 138 Id. 
 139 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
 140 495 N.E.2d 337, 339 (N.Y. 1986). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 341. 
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adverse side effects associated with the treatment and any less in-
trusive alternative treatments.143
In Rivers, the New York Court of Appeals demonstrated a concern for 
maintaining autonomy and liberty by requiring narrowly tailored 
remedies.144  Article 81 of New York’s Mental Hygiene law also ex-
presses this preference.145  Article 17-A, however, grants mentally 
retarded individuals substantially less protection against infringement 
on individual autonomy.146  While at least one group has looked into 
the possibility of revising Article 17-A to more closely resemble Article 
81, no current proposals exist.147
V. LEGAL PROCEDURES AND LEGAL ROLES 
The legal process, including encounters with judges and lawyers, 
can be intimidating, overwhelming, and somewhat incomprehensi-
ble, even to adults with above-average intellectual functioning.  For 
those with mild cognitive impairment, a guardianship proceeding can 
have serious negative effects.  First, while guardianship proceedings 
and the legal actors involved intend to help an individual who may be 
incompetent, a challenge to an individual’s competence can have 
negative effects on mental well-being, confidence, and morale.148  
Second, the behaviors and practices of judges and lawyers involved in 
the guardianship proceedings can cause confusion, alienation, and 
loss of control among participants.149  Furthermore, stereotypes fre-
quently influence judges’ and lawyers’ perceptions of, and behavior 
toward, disabled individuals.150  If traditional stereotypes about per-
sons with cognitive impairment color the perceptions of judges and 
lawyers, they may fail to listen to and communicate with these indi-
viduals in an appropriate manner.151
 143 Id. at 344. 
 144 Id. 
 145 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 1996). 
 146 Id. § 81.01, Practice Commentaries by Rose Mary Bailly 248, 250. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See infra Part V.A.1. 
 149 See infra Part V.A.2. 
 150 See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Prac-
tice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 134 (1999).  Rubinson argues that attorneys’ perceptions of 
elderly clients risk being influenced by stereotypes that the elderly are forgetful, de-
clining in competence, and senile.  Id. at 134–35.  Rubinson cites works by other 
scholars that suggest that race, socioeconomic status, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
gender, and physical disability are also likely to impact an attorney’s view of a client.  
Id. at 134 n.61 (citations omitted). 
 151 See, e.g., id. at 134. 
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Both the autonomy-limiting nature of a guardianship determina-
tion and the abilities of persons with mild cognitive impairment 
coalesce to create a unique opportunity to apply the principles of TJ 
in order to provide optimal outcomes in guardianship determina-
tions for persons with mild cognitive impairment.  To create such 
outcomes, the legal system should impose additional procedures, and 
its actors should make concerted efforts to ensure that: (1) legal ac-
tors listen to and understand the needs and desires of the ward or 
potential ward; and (2) learn about the nature of his or her impair-
ment and how the impairment impacts his or her cognitive, 
judgmental, and other capacities.  While seemingly simplistic, the 
ability of judges and lawyers to listen to the desires and needs of indi-
viduals has been linked to increased satisfaction with legal 
outcomes.152
A. The “Front-End”: Determining Incompetency 
The importance of participation, accuracy, and objectivity at the 
“front-end” of guardianship is crucial to the success of the guardian-
ship arrangement.  If an individual is not appropriately and 
objectively assessed to determine abilities, desires, and preferences, 
the guardianship arrangement is likely to be ill-suited to the individ-
ual’s needs.153  Even under progressive guardianship regimes, like 
New York’s Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, which mandate evidence 
of actual incapacity prior to a determination of incapacity,154 there is 
room for improvement.  Principles of TJ can provide assistance in this 
area. 
1. The Psychology of Guardianships of Persons with Mild 
Cognitive Impairment: Effects of Incompetency 
Labeling and Restrictions on Autonomy 
First, legal actors must understand that a legal determination of 
incompetency or incapacity can have a devastating personal and emo-
tional impact on the individual deemed incompetent.155  Bruce 
Winick observes: 
 Labeling individuals as incompetent usually has the effect of 
removing their ability to make decisions for themselves, at least in 
 152 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, in 
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 3, at 309, 309–10; see infra Part 
V.A.2. 
 153 See supra text accompanying notes 107–09. 
 154 See supra text accompanying notes 116–28. 
 155 Winick, supra note 13, at 26. 
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the particular area in which their capacity is thought to be lack-
ing.  Individuals considered to be incompetent find that their 
choices and preferences are ignored and that others make 
choices for them.  They often are treated as objects, rather than as 
people.  As a result, events in their lives are perceived to be out-
side of their control.  They are treated as children, subject to the 
authority, even if benevolently intended, of others.156
For persons with mild cognitive impairment, the impact of un-
necessary infringements on personal autonomy can be particularly 
devastating.  Because individuals in this group tend to have various 
intellectual and practical abilities, even a narrowly tailored guardian-
ship arrangement can have the effect of undermining the individual’s 
confidence and morale, both in the area or areas in which the indi-
vidual is deemed incompetent, as well as in the areas still left to the 
individual’s discretion.157  While the arrangement may in fact be ap-
propriate and necessary and is intended to help the individual, it can 
have a negative effect, especially if the incompetency label is attrib-
uted to an area that is important to the individual’s self-concept or 
identity.158
Further, researchers have found that labels of incompetency can 
create feelings of powerlessness and loss of control, the most serious 
of which is the phenomenon of learned helplessness.159  Individuals 
who are deemed incompetent may begin to feel that their actions 
cannot influence outcomes, and, thus, they feel a loss of control.160  If 
individuals attribute the inability to control outcomes to immutable 
personal limitations, they may feel unable to meaningfully contribute 
to any decisions.  This feeling of loss of control can wreak havoc on 
self-esteem, motivation, and morale, while causing the individual to 
feel that his or her inability is a personal failure that affects all areas 
of functioning and that will always be present.161  This can cause the 
individual to stop trying to exert influence, or to become more pas-
sive, in their attempts to control their own lives.162  Such a result 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 26–27. 
 158 See, e.g., EDWARD E. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED 
RELATIONSHIPS 116 (1984). 
 159 See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 10.; Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in 
Humans: An Attributional Analysis, in HUMAN HELPLESSNESS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 
3 (Judy Garber & Martin E.P. Seligman eds., Academic Press, Inc. 1980). 
 160 Winick, supra note 13, at 29. 
 161 Id. at 29–30. 
 162 Id. 
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demonstrates how a seemingly protective law or system can have un-
intended and unfortunate effects.163
Recent research further affirms the importance of perceptions 
of control amongst persons with mild cognitive impairment.164  Re-
searchers assessed stress, coping strategies, perceptions of control, 
and psychological distress in a sample of eighty-eight adults with mild 
cognitive impairment.165  The researchers found that the subjects 
were most likely to use the most desirable method of coping with 
stress, active coping,166 in stressful situations appraised as controlla-
ble.167  The researchers concluded that “this may mean that attempts 
to foster effective coping among people with mild mental retardation 
are contingent upon increasing perceptions of control.”168
While not all persons with mild cognitive impairment who are 
placed under some form of guardianship arrangement experience 
feelings of loss of control or learned helplessness, it is important for 
legal actors to recognize and understand the effects of the incompe-
tency or incapacity determination on the psychological state of the 
individual.  The drug and mental health courts provide insights into 
ways to minimize the negative effects of such a determination.169
2. Minimizing Anti-Therapeutic Consequences at the 
“Front-End”: Using Social Science to Inform Legal 
Actors 
Legal actors can seek to minimize the negative impact and in-
crease the accuracy of incompetency determinations in several ways.  
To do this, legal actors must increase their knowledge about persons 
with mild cognitive impairment and must also develop a greater un-
derstanding of their own beliefs about this population.  First, judges 
must realize that their status as authority figures may have strong ef-
fects on the individuals they deem incompetent, perhaps increasing 
 163 Id. at 17–18. 
 164 Hartley & MacLean, supra note 100, at 294. 
 165 Id. at 287–88. 
 166 For the purposes of this research, active coping was defined as “efforts aimed at 
gaining control over the stressful situation or over one’s emotions.”  Id. at 286.  
Other methods of coping with stress that were assessed in this study were “distraction 
coping,” defined as “efforts aimed to distract from the stressful situation through 
positive thoughts and positive activities,” and “avoidant coping,” defined as “efforts 
aimed at avoiding or disengaging from the stressful situation or one’s emotional ex-
perience.”  Id. 
 167 Id. at 294. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See supra text accompanying notes 33–57. 
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the tendency for the individuals to feel that they are completely inca-
pable in the areas of life for which a judge appoints a guardian.170  
Second, while objectivity is a hallmark of most judicial decision-
making, stereotypes about people with cognitive impairment may in-
fluence even judges.  Because of this possibility, judges can benefit 
from specialized training and education about the unique needs and 
abilities of persons with mild cognitive impairment.171  In fact, a moni-
toring study conducted by the American Bar Association 
recommended that courts “designate certain judges to be responsible 
for guardianship hearings and review procedures.”172
Just as drug-court judges become well versed on the topics of 
addiction and rehabilitation,173 and mental-health-court judges be-
come intimately familiar with mental disorders and treatment,174 it is 
important for judges who take part in guardianship proceedings to 
familiarize themselves with the unique abilities of persons with mild 
cognitive impairment and with the psychological consequences that a 
judge’s rather routine decision-making can have on individuals sub-
ject to guardianship arrangements.  With this knowledge, judges can 
transform their behaviors when dealing with this population. 
In keeping with the drug-court model, judges presiding over 
guardianships should depart from the traditional adjudicative ap-
proach characterized by “disinterest, impartiality, passivity, and 
restraint,”175 and instead should become proactive in their interac-
tions with wards with mild cognitive impairment to ensure the least 
restrictive and most appropriate guardianship arrangement.176  For 
instance, judges should make sincere efforts to understand the im-
pact of an individual’s mild cognitive impairment on that individual’s 
actual abilities.177  Judges should tailor their speech—its content, 
speed, and level of sophistication—to the needs of the individual and 
should attempt to clearly explain the reasoning behind any determi-
nations to the individual, rather than solely to the lawyer or the 
 170 Winick, supra note 13, at 31. 
 171 See infra text accompanying notes 187–93. 
 172 SALLY BALCH HURME, STEPS TO ENHANCE GUARDIANSHIP MONITORING 10–11 
(1991). 
 173 See NOLAN, supra note 37, at 135–38. 
 174 See Kondo, supra note 50, at 292–93. 
 175 NOLAN, supra note 37, at 92. 
 176 Id. at 94.  Nolan discusses how the “drug court judge deliberately departs from 
the kind of passive role Tocqueville saw as a defining quality of the American judici-
ary.”  Id. 
 177 Such efforts are consistent with a focus on a functional evaluation of an indi-
vidual.  See supra text accompanying notes 107–09. 
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guardian.  The judge should also encourage the ward’s active partici-
pation during the hearing. 
All of these behaviors will likely reduce the intimidation or inse-
curity that a hearing and interaction with an authoritative judicial 
figure may engender in an individual subject to a guardianship pro-
ceeding.  Further, such active participation by the judge may increase 
the individual’s satisfaction with the overall result of the hearing.178  
Bruce Winick, a founder of the TJ movement, summarizes the em-
pirical studies in this area in the following passage: 
Litigants highly value the process or dignitary value of a hearing.  
People who feel they have been treated fairly at the hearing, with 
respect and dignity and in good faith, experience greater litigant 
satisfaction than those who feel treated unfairly, with disrespect, 
and in bad faith.  People highly value “voice,” the ability to tell 
their story, and “validation,” the feeling that what they have had 
to say was taken seriously by the judge or other decision-maker.  
When people are treated these ways at a hearing, they are often 
satisfied with the result even if it is adverse to them, and comply 
more readily with the outcome of the hearing.  Moreover, they 
experience the results of the proceeding as less coercive than 
when these conditions are violated, and even feel that they have 
voluntarily chosen the course that is judicially imposed.  Such 
feelings of voluntariness rather than coercion tend to produce 
more effective behavior on their part.179
Lawyers can also play a role in increasing the overall positive 
outcome of a guardianship proceeding.  Research in the field of cog-
nitive psychology suggests that lawyers who take an active approach in 
explaining elements and aspects of the legal process to their clients 
can reduce the stress experienced by the client.180  The client’s re-
duced stress may be attributed to having information that enables 
him or her to adjust expectations “in a realistic way and to prepare 
emotionally to meet the challenges ahead.”181  Like judges, lawyers 
must adjust their language to meet the needs of a mildly cognitively 
impaired client.  Also like judges, lawyers should assume a more ac-
tive posture when dealing with a client with mild cognitive 
impairment; they should attempt to converse with their clients in a 
 178 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (citing studies that found disputants’ judgments about 
procedural justice affect perceptions of substantive justice as well as disputants’ 
evaluations of authorities and institutions). 
 179 Winick, supra note 152, at 320–21. 
 180 See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 203 (1984). 
 181 Winick, supra note 152, at 313. 
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manner that demonstrates their sincere desire to attain the best out-
come possible. 
Another influential actor in this setting is the guardian ad litem 
(GAL).  Many states provide for court appointment of an independ-
ent third party to investigate the circumstances and assess the needs 
of an alleged disabled person, to safeguard the procedural rights of 
an alleged disabled person, and to advocate on the person’s behalf.182  
The GAL is often a lawyer, but not always.183  The GAL can play a vital 
role in assuring that the court understands the abilities and needs of 
the person with mild cognitive impairment.184  The GAL is a uniquely 
situated actor, because of his or her extended or in-depth contact 
with the person subject to a potential guardianship.185  The GAL is 
also more objective than a proposed guardian’s attorney, because the 
proposed guardian—usually a parent—may be more likely to over-
emphasize the limitations of the proposed ward.186  Further, as an 
advocate, a GAL can play a crucial role in preventing “rubber-
stamping” of guardianship applications and can urge the judge to 
undertake a more thorough inquiry into the needs and abilities of 
proposed wards.  To effectuate this, a GAL should receive specialized 
training about the abilities and needs of persons with mild cognitive 
impairment.  Also, as discussed below, a GAL must also acknowledge 
any beliefs or stereotypes about persons with cognitive impairment 
that are in conflict with his or her role as advocate. 
Clearly, in order to create optimal outcomes for this population, 
legal actors must increase their knowledge and awareness about per-
sons with mild cognitive impairment.  Increasing awareness, however, 
does not end there.  In fact, legal actors must make efforts to increase 
self-awareness about stereotypes they may hold concerning persons 
with mild cognitive impairment.  Judges, lawyers, guardians, and 
GALs must acknowledge stereotypes they likely hold about persons 
with cognitive impairment, and they must not allow these stereotypes 
to color their perceptions of the abilities of the individual.  By defini-
tion, a stereotype is “a generalized (sometimes accurate but often 
 182 SCOTT K. SUMMERS, GUARDIANSHIP & CONSERVATORSHIP: A HANDBOOK FOR 
LAWYERS 51–52 (1996). 
 183 Id. at 51. 
 184 Id. at 52 (“The involvement of a GAL . . . probably is the single best assurance 
that an alleged disabled person will be accorded full due process rights.”). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. (suggesting that family members keep a “respectful distance” from the GAL 
and “cooperate fully with all requests for information” so as to maintain the objectiv-
ity of the GAL and the privacy of the conversations between the GAL and proposed 
ward). 
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overgeneralized) belief about a group of people.”187  Research in the 
field of cognitive psychology has demonstrated that stereotyped be-
liefs are rooted in categorization and the need to simplify the 
world.188
While categorization may aid information processing, it fre-
quently also “biases our perceptions of diversity.”189  This is 
particularly dangerous when legal actors, such as judges and lawyers, 
interact with persons with cognitive impairment.  Research has shown 
that people tend to view themselves, and those in their groups (e.g., 
their racial group), as possessing more individuality and diversity 
than those in groups other than their own.190  People also tend to 
overestimate the similarity of those in groups dissimilar to their 
own.191  Such research is informative in the legal setting because it is 
likely that many judges and lawyers consider themselves distinct from 
other segments of the population, due to their education level and 
the prestige associated with the legal profession.  Assuming this to be 
true, judges and lawyers as a group may feel particularly different 
from those with cognitive impairments.192  Therefore, they may be 
more likely to view these persons as similar in abilities and capacity, 
despite differences in level of impairment.193  Such stereotypes may 
result in an inappropriate assessment of incompetency and have the 
potential to affect the integrity of the overall guardianship arrange-
ment. 
 The “front-end” of guardianship also involves the appointment 
of a guardian.194  To follow a TJ model, the court must appoint a 
guardian based on an accurate and informed determination of in-
competency while ensuring that the ward is agreeable to the choice 
of guardian.  Ensuring the ward’s agreement with the choice of 
guardian is typically not an issue, as the law of most states presumes 
that the guardian will be a close family member.  Despite this pre-
 187 MYERS, supra note 9, at 695. 
 188 Id. at 697. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 697–98. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See generally JACQUES-PHILIPPE LEYENS ET AL., STEREOTYPES AND SOCIAL COGNITION 
107 (1994) (discussing empirical support for the theory that “people hold a more 
complex representation of the ingroup than of the outgroup”). 
 193 This conclusion is an application of research findings in the area of race and 
its effects on categorization and stereotyping.  See Robert K. Bothwell et al., Cross-
racial Identification, in PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 15, 19–25 
(March 1989). 
 194 Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 867.  This Comment will not deal in great 
length with this aspect of the “front-end.” 
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sumption, a TJ perspective cautions against placing unquestioned 
faith in the presumed family guardian.  As one author noted on the 
issue of elder autonomy, “[i]n . . . situations of shared authority be-
tween the family and the individual, especially in a home 
environment, the erosion of autonomy may be incremental rather 
than sudden, and the mundane nature of most decisions may camou-
flage this loss as it occurs.  The loss of autonomy is real nonethe- 
less . . . .”195  This insight applies with equal force to guardianships in-
volving persons with mild cognitive impairment, and it counsels in 
favor of enhanced accountability and monitoring—even when a 
guardian is the parent or other close relative of the ward. 
B. The “Back-End”: Accountability and Monitoring 
The “back-end” of guardianship arrangements involves guardian 
accountability and monitoring of guardianship arrangements.196  Ac-
cording to two well-known guardianship scholars, “[t]he key to the 
quality of guardianship monitoring is the judge.”197  They state that: 
[T]he judge often has wide latitude in shaping court practices in 
guardian oversight.  The judge may determine how frequently re-
ports are filed in jurisdictions that allow discretion, what the 
reports should look like, what assistance guardians will have in 
preparation of the report, how the reports will be tracked and re-
viewed, whether investigators will follow up on “red flag” items, 
whether sanctions will be imposed, how the complaint process will 
be handled, and whether funds will be sought for resources moni-
toring.198
 Other commentators have likewise substantiated the impor-
tance of the role of the judge to the “back-end” of guardianship.  One 
commentator writes that “[o]nly when judges become acculturated to 
the existing reforms, and only when they internalize the values em-
bedded in those reforms, will guardianship truly change.”199  Clearly, 
judges are crucially important figures at the “back end” of guardian-
ship. 
First, in order to improve judicial monitoring of the guardian to 
hold the guardian accountable for any abuses or other breaches in 
the guardian’s fiduciary duty to a ward, judges must educate them-
 195 Marshall B. Kapp, Who’s the Parent Here? The Family’s Impact on the Autonomy of 
Older Persons, 41 EMORY L.J. 773, 777 (1992). 
 196 Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 867. 
 197 Id. at 914. 
 198 Id. at 914–15. 
 199 Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 355 (1998). 
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selves about the importance of efforts to ensure ward safety and to 
prevent unnecessary infringements on autonomy.  Judges must fully 
perceive the guardianship determination, and the appointment of a 
guardian, as only the first steps in a guardianship proceeding.  The 
nature and quality of judicial involvement in drug and mental health 
courts is instructive on this point.200  Some drug-court judges have be-
come involved in the lives of “clients” outside of the courtroom, 
contacting employers and becoming involved in community efforts.201  
Such behavior provides a positive message to guardians, wards, and 
the community at large. 
Second, the designation of a specialized judge for guardianship 
hearings and review procedures is certainly beneficial because “of the 
specialized nature of cases involving incapacitated persons,” and the 
judge’s “need to be familiar with the complexities of case manage-
ment and surrogate decision-making for individuals with complicated 
mental and medical problems.”202
Finally, guardian education and training and community and 
public awareness about guardianship arrangements can also help to 
ensure that guardianship arrangements provide optimal benefits to 
wards.203  Devising guardianship training and education requirements 
is difficult,204 and depends largely on the needs of each individual 
ward.  However, judges should assume a leadership role and take it 
upon themselves to narrowly tailor statutory requirements regarding 
guardian accountability and monitoring to fit the needs of each indi-
vidual. 
Particularly in arrangements involving persons with mild cogni-
tive impairments, judges should explore the possibility of 
modification orders in the event the scope of the existing guardian-
ship arrangement is no longer appropriate.205  Frequently, 
modification orders are made to widen the scope of a guardian’s dis-
cretion and power over a ward, but judges should be cognizant of the 
possibility for contraction of guardian powers in cases involving per-
sons with mild cognitive impairment.  This is due to the fact that 
 200 See NOLAN, supra note 37, at 94–95. 
 201 Id. at 95–97. 
 202 Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 917. 
 203 Id. at 877, 918, 920. 
 204 Id. at 877. 
 205 See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1755 (Consol. 2004).  This statute provides 
for a modification order to modify the guardianship arrangement in the interest of 
protecting the mentally retarded person’s “financial situation and/or his or her per-
sonal interests.”  Id. 
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persons with mild cognitive impairment may experience increases in 
adaptive functioning.206
According to the DSM-IV, “[a]daptive functioning may be influ-
enced by various factors, including education, motivation, personality 
characteristics, social and vocational opportunities, and the mental 
disorders and general medical conditions that may coexist with Men-
tal Retardation.”207  The DSM-IV further states that “[p]roblems in 
adaptation are more likely to improve with remedial efforts than is 
the cognitive IQ, which tends to remain a more stable attribute.”208  
Adaptive functioning is conceptually indistinguishable from the no-
tion of functionalism that is assessed in incompetency determi-
nations.209  Therefore, judges should be aware of the potential for 
improvement in the ward’s abilities and the possibility of contracting 
the guardian’s power. 
Community and public awareness efforts are also important in 
that they can foster social awareness about guardianship monitoring.  
As one commentator states: “if the community knows what guardians 
are supposed to do, guardians may be more likely to do it.”210  Fur-
ther, efforts to inform the community about guardianship 
arrangements may function to dispel stereotypes by promoting un-
derstanding about the capacities and needs of persons with cognitive 
impairment. 
VI. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Proponents of the TJ movement study “the role of the law as a 
therapeutic agent.”211  A major criticism leveled against TJ is that it is 
inappropriate for legal actors to engage in “therapeutic” activity.212  
Further, proponents of “therapeutic” processes and justice must ad-
dress the obvious issues of cost and inefficiency.213
 206 DSM-IV, supra note 87, at 42.  Adaptive functioning is a psychological term of 
art used in the DSM-IV to refer to “how effectively individuals cope with common life 
demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence expected 
of someone in their particular age group, sociocultural background, and community 
setting.”  Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 See supra Part IV for a discussion of Article 81’s functional assessment. 
 210 Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 920. 
 211 Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii. 
 212 Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2072. 
 213 See, e.g., Hurme and Wood, supra note 62, at 883 (discussing cost as a barrier to 
implementing guardianship reforms). 
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A major criticism of TJ principles involves the “therapeutic” 
practice of law by judges and other legal actors.214  One critic, the 
Honorable Morris Hoffman, expresses concern that the “new thera-
peutic judges” take on the role of “amateur therapists.”215  Another 
critic, Professor John Petrila, contends that “the assumption that law-
yers and mental health professionals should act in concert to identify 
and promote therapeutic values as one of the core functions of the 
legal system” needs “critical examination.”216  While the concerns of 
Judge Hoffman and Professor Petrila are understandable, a judge’s 
concern that an outcome that he or she devises be effective and ap-
propriate is less akin to an attempt to be an “amateur therapist” and 
more indicative of an attempt to create a fair and effective remedy. 
Further, the notion of therapeutic processes should not bring to 
mind clichéd visions of troubled patients lying on couches.  Instead, 
one should recognize therapeutic processes as attempts to utilize ad-
vances in social science and law to create optimal outcomes.217  
Perhaps some of the doubts surrounding the TJ movement as a 
proper legal movement stem from an unwillingness to recognize that 
judges should incorporate aspects of social science into the practice 
of law.  But judges do this in many areas of the law.218  Or, perhaps 
the idea of “soft” social science used in conjunction with “hard” legal 
principles is disconcerting and considered dangerous to the proper 
administration of justice.219
Judge Hoffman offered his criticisms in the context of the TJ 
movement’s relation to the drug-court movement.220  Judge Hoffman 
writes: 
 Drug courts are the most visible, but by no means the only, judi-
cial expression of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement.  The 
idea that judges should be in the business of treating the psyches 
of the people who appear before them is taking hold not only in 
 214 Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2072. 
 215 Id. 
 216 John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at 685, 696. 
 217 Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii (“[TJ] is an in-
terdisciplinary enterprise designed to produce scholarship that is particularly useful 
for law reform.”). 
 218 For perhaps the most well-known example of the use of social science research 
in legal proceedings, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).  In 
Brown, the Supreme Court relied upon research that found segregation had a de-
structive psychological impact on black children.  Id. at 494–95. 
 219 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2063–65. 
 220 Id. at 2067. 
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drug courts but in a host of other criminal and even civil set-
tings.221
Judge Hoffman considers the idea of “therapeutic judges” to be 
dangerous for several reasons.222  His primary criticism is that judges 
that employ principles of TJ are “amateur therapists but have the 
powers of real judges” and that these judges “act in concert with each 
other, their communities, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and the self-
interested therapeutic cottage industry, contrary to the fundamental 
principle of judicial independence.”223  To the extent that Judge 
Hoffman’s opposition to the TJ movement and its embodiment in 
drug courts is related to his resistance to the disease model of addic-
tion and his belief that drug courts undermine the retributive goals 
of the criminal justice system,224 it is inapposite to a critique of a 
therapeutic approach to guardianship proceedings and arrange-
ments. 
Judge Hoffman’s concern that “therapeutic” judges act as “ama-
teur therapists” is somewhat overstated.  While Judge Hoffman 
applies this argument primarily in the drug-court setting, he also ex-
presses concern about the use of TJ principles in other settings, 
including civil settings.225  Judge Hoffman’s belief that judges will act 
as “amateur therapists” ignores the reality that judges that preside 
over mental health or guardianship cases will consult with and be ad-
vised by expert witnesses—such as psychiatrists and psychologists—
and will form a judgment based on input from these specialists.226  
Thus, these judges are not acting as would-be psychiatrists; rather 
they are participating in a multi-disciplinary approach to understand-
ing complex issues.  Further, model judges—be they in drug courts 
or in mental health courts, or presiding over guardianship proceed-
ings and arrangements—will be intimately familiar with issues of 
addiction, mental illness, and the effects of cognitive impairment on 
behavior, respectively.227  Fears of judges acting beyond the bounds of 
their authority and competency are exaggerated because judicial dis-
cretion is appropriately constrained, and so-called judicial activism is 
nothing more than a willingness to address problems holistically. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 2072. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. at 2067–68, 2075–76. 
 225 Hoffman, supra note 56, at 2067. 
 226 See, e.g., Kondo, supra note 50, at 293. 
 227 Id. at 287 (discussing the unique qualifications necessary for the position of 
mental health court judge). 
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Professor Petrila’s criticisms of the TJ movement, as they apply 
to the applications of TJ to guardianship proceedings, include the 
following: 
 Significantly, Essays [a collection of essays authored by the foun-
ders of TJ which explore applications of TJ principles] fails to 
question who decides what represents a therapeutic outcome.  In-
stead, Essays simply assumes that research scientists and lawyers 
will decide whether a particular legal rule or intervention has 
therapeutic value.  People treated voluntarily or coercively by 
mental health professionals and subject to legal rules governing 
the conditions and terms of that treatment are largely ignored.  
As a result, people who can provide the best information about 
the therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences of le-
gal/therapeutic interventions are excluded from participating in 
the analysis of what is or is not in their interest.  Therapeutic ju-
risprudence as it has been conceptualized to date is a 
conservative, arguably paternalistic, approach to mental disability 
law.228
The argument that TJ largely ignores those whom it is intended 
to help is inimical to the very nature of the movement.  Principles of 
TJ have been applied to better understand addiction, mental illness, 
and mental capacity in order to best serve the interests of persons 
whose lives intersect with the legal system due to drugs, mental ill-
ness, or some type of incapacity.  It is in this capacity that the TJ 
movement seeks to enhance therapeutic consequences and reduce 
anti-therapeutic consequences, all without “subordinating due proc-
ess and other justice values.”229
Within the guardianship setting, TJ principles encourage legal 
actors to recognize the importance of the participation of a mildly 
cognitively impaired ward in the guardianship arena.  Further, em-
pirical research suggests that active participation in legal proceedings 
increases satisfaction with outcomes.230  Certainly increased satisfac-
tion is a “therapeutic outcome” that incorporates the experience of 
the person subject to legal processes.  While not without force, Pro-
fessor Petrila’s criticisms of the TJ movement are not persuasive in 
the guardianship context. 
Other criticisms of the TJ movement involve time and cost con-
siderations.  Certainly, involving judges, lawyers, guardians, and wards 
to the extent suggested in this Comment will sacrifice efficiency in 
 228 Petrila, supra note 216, at 688. 
 229 Introduction to LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 13, at xvii. 
 230 See generally LIND & TYLER, supra note 178. 
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guardianship proceedings.  Further, training and education efforts 
for legal actors, guardians, and wards require time and money.231  
Some have suggested cutting costs through practical training solu-
tions for new guardians using existing community resources.232  These 
suggestions could apply with equal force to training for judges and 
lawyers. 
Economic and efficiency arguments in the guardianship setting 
are powerful.  However, the legal community must remain mindful of 
the very essence of guardianship as an institution that sacrifices indi-
vidual autonomy.  Such arrangements require careful scrutiny and an 
active legal system in order to ensure that they are appropriate and 
carefully tailored.  Many persons with mild cognitive impairment 
need the assistance of a guardian; these people also need to retain 
autonomy and control in areas of their lives in which they are compe-
tent and capable.  A justice system that is informed by principles of TJ 
will better serve this population. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
Guardianship arrangements involving persons with mild cogni-
tive impairment present a unique opportunity in which the principles 
of TJ can be applied to improve the “front-end” and “back-end” of 
guardianship proceedings and arrangements.233  Persons with mild 
cognitive impairment are capable of so much, yet likely need assis-
tance in some areas of their lives.  The application of TJ principles in 
this context illuminates important areas of concern, such as appro-
priate assessment based on objective, functional methodologies.234  
Further application of TJ principles in this setting can ultimately im-
prove the quality of life for many persons in need of some form of 
guardianship arrangement by allowing for more control and partici-
pation in the guardianship process.235  The key to overcoming 
systemic discrimination and misunderstanding is to make legal actors, 
legislators, and the public see persons with mild cognitive impair-
ment as more like them, and less like a distant “other.”  A TJ 
approach, informed by social science, can help this process.  Finally, 
approaching guardianship using a TJ lens need not raise concerns 
 231 Hurme & Wood, supra note 62, at 883 (discussing examples of cost as a sub-
stantial barrier to training). 
 232 Id. at 884 (citing the use of community resources, such as guardianship agen-
cies and associations, as a way to reduce costs associated with training). 
 233 See supra Parts V.A–B. 
 234 See supra Part IV. 
 235 See supra Parts V.A–B. 
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about inappropriate judicial activism or the “unlicensed practice” of 
psychology by judicial actors,236 but, rather, it should be viewed as a 
comprehensive and integrative approach to guardianship arrange-
ments involving a uniquely situated group of individuals. 
 
 
 236 See supra Part VI. 
